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Abstract
Gas and vapour explosions have been involved in industrial accidents since the
beginnings of industry. A century ago, at 11:55 am on Friday 24th September
1920, the petroleum barge Warwick exploded in London’s docklands and seven
men were killed. Understanding what happened when it blew up as it was being
refurbished, and how to prevent similar explosions, involves chemistry plus fluid
mechanics. I recount the 1920 accident as an example, together with the history of
thermo-kinetic explosions prior to 1920 and up to the present day, and I review the
history and the actual state of the science of ignition. The science of explosions
has been aware of its societal implications from the beginning. Despite advances
in health and safety over the past century, is there still work to do?
1 Gas and vapour explosions before 1920
One risk of using a public toilet in ancient Rome was of getting one’s bottom singed (or
worse); methane explosions in sewers were known from classical times [1, 2, 3]. Mines
too have always accumulated inflammable gases, in particular firedamp (methane),
which has caused explosions for as long as mining itself. So it is not surprising that it
is in mining that we see the first research on preventing gas explosions.
The 1812 disaster at Felling pit near Gateshead, where 92 men were killed through a
methane explosion, was one of the stimuli for the invention of safety lamps to prevent
explosions [4]. Humphry Davy and George Stephenson were two of the key figures
involved in developing safe miners’ lamps— the Davy lamp [5] and the Geordie lamp
[6] respectively — designed to supersede the use of naked candle flames to illuminate
mines. Davy’s lamp used a wire gauze to supply air; Stephenson’s Geordie lamp used
narrow tubes for the same purpose. (There was a somewhat squalid dispute between
the two men and their supporters over priority in the invention [4, 6].)
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Humphry Davy had an assistant when working on the safety lamp. That was
Michael Faraday. Faraday later took over Davy’s position at the Royal Institution and
wrote a beautiful book, The Chemical History of a Candle [7]. About mine explosions,
he wrote that
“In olden times the miner had to find his own candles, and it was supposed
that a small candle would not so soon set fire to the fire-damp in the coal
mines as a large one ... They have been replaced since then by the steel-
mill, and then by the Davy-lamp, and other safety-lamps of various kinds.”
Early safety lamps were dimmer than candles and the gauze or tube did not completely
eliminate the risk of explosion, and improvements to the designs of miners’ safety
lamps continued to be worked on throughout the 19th century [4, 8].
As well as gases, inflammable vapours1 were likewise the cause of explosions.
Thomas Graham, of Graham’s law fame, was one of those who investigated the loss of
the paddle steamer Amazon in 1852. While the cause of the fire that led to 105 to 115
deaths when she sank off the Isles of Scilly on her maiden voyage was never absolutely
established, Graham thought that the presence of volatile inflammable liquids in the
store room near to the engines was a key factor [9]:
“The sudden and powerful burst of flame from the store-room, which oc-
curred at the very outset of the conflagration, suggests strongly the inter-
vention of a volatile combustible, such as turpentine, although the pres-
ence of a tin can of that substance in the store-room appears to be left
uncertain. I find, upon trial, that the vapour given off by oil of turpentine
is sufficiently dense, at a temperature somewhat below 100◦, to make air
explosive upon the approach of a light. Any escape of turpentine from
the heated store-room would therefore endanger a spread of flame by the
vapour communicating with the lamps burning in the boiler room or even
with the fires of the furnaces.”
On 2nd October 1874, the Tilbury, a barge on the Regent’s Canal in London, ex-
ploded killing its crew of four; it was carrying both barrels of petroleum and gunpow-
der. The spot, at the edge of Regent’s Park under a bridge over the canal, is now called
Blow Up Bridge. It was lucky, as it were, that this happened at 5am, otherwise many
more people would have died [10, 11]. Frederick Abel, developer of guncotton and
inventor of cordite, mentioned this example in a lecture “On Accidental Explosions”
he gave at the Royal Institution in 1875 that was subsequently printed in Nature [12]:
“Among other “accidents” referred to as arising from a similar cause, was
the recent explosion of the powder-laden barge in the Regent’s Canal. It
was established by a sound chain of circumstantial evidence that this ex-
plosion must have been caused by the ignition, in the cabin of the barge, of
an explosive mixture of air and of the vapour of petroleum, derived from
1There is no difference between a gas and a vapour in terms of their fluid physics or chemistry; only in
terms of their thermodynamics. The different terms simply indicate that a gas is a substance found at that
temperature and pressure only in the single thermodynamic gaseous state, whereas a vapour is also found in
its condensed phase at the same temperature and pressure.
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the leakage of certain packages of the spirit which were packed along with
the powder.”
The Tilbury accident accelerated the passing of the Explosives Act in 1875, which in
the UK regulated the manufacture and carriage of dangerous substances.
The industrializing world was demanding more and more chemical products. The
petrochemical industry was, figuratively speaking, exploding. Abel returned to the
theme of accidental explosions a decade later for another lecture at the Royal Insti-
tution in 1885, this time entitled “Accidental Explosions Produced by Non-Explosive
Liquids”, in which he specifically discussed “accidents connected with the transport,
storage, and use of volatile inflammable liquids which are receiving extensive applica-
tion, chiefly as solvents and as illuminating agents” [13].
Redwood wrote a very thorough report in 1894 on ‘the transport of petroleum in
bulk’ [14] motivated by the explosion of the petroleum tank-steamship Tancarville
while being worked on in Newport, Wales in 1891, in which 5 men were killed. Red-
wood comments
“In a lecture delivered at the Royal Institution, on the 12th March, 1875,
Sir Frederick Abel called attention to the special danger arising from the
accumulation of the vapour of petroleum spirit, or or the similar liquid,
in unventilated places and referred to several cases of fire and explosion
in illustration of his remarks, including one which occurred with coal-tar
naphtha in 1847. In a more recent lecture (on the 13th March, 1885) he
enlarged upon this theme, and gave particulars of explosions due to the
use on board Her Majesty’s ships of paint-driers containing dangerously
inflammable liquid hydrocarbons. For many years past Colonel Majendie
has briefly described in the Annual Reports of H.M. Inspectors of Explo-
sives, the more noteworthy of the petroleum accidents which have taken
place during the preceding twelvemonths (although petroleum, not being
an explosive substance, does not come within the scope of the Explosives
Act); and his reports constitute most valuable contributions to the literature
of the subject.”
In his report Redwood lists many other similar incidents that give a depressing
litany even at this early date of the petrochemical industry.
“These accidents arose from the incautious handling of a material which
was not generally known to contain a liquid readily converted into vapour,
and in that condition capable of forming a powerfully explosive mixture
with air”,
he writes. Of the Tancarville in particular he relates
“The evidence given at the Board of Trade inquiry conclusively demon-
strated that the accident was due to the ignition of an explosive mixture
of petroleum vapour and air in the ballast tank, but did not clear up the
question of how the ignition took place. Samples of the petroleum were
examined by Dr. Dupre´ and by the Author, with the result that it was ascer-
tained that one gallon of such oil would render 200 cubic feet of air feebly,
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and, about 58 feet of air strongly, explosive; therefore 20 cubic feet of oil
would have sufficed to render the atmosphere of the water-ballast tank, the
capacity of which was about 6,000 cubic feet, explosive.”
As we shall see, the 1920 accident was to be very similar in its origin. Just the year
before the accident that is our principal example, on 15th July 1919 there occurred the
Cardiff dockland disaster when the oil tanker Roseleaf exploded, killing the 12 men
working on her. This was determined to be owing to a man carrying a naked flame
down into the ship.
2 The explosion of the petroleum barge, Warwick, on
24th September 1920
The Isle of Dogs, a tongue of land formed by a large curve of the River Thames in
east London, was once marshes but by the turn of the 20th century had become a great
hub of industrial activity related to the river. Samuel Hodge & Sons, engineers and
ship repairers, had premises at Union Iron Works, 104 Westferry Road in Millwall,
the Isle of Dogs, from the 1850s to the mid-1920s. The site of these works where the
accident that killed 7 men occurred is now part of a public park on the riverbank, the
Sir John McDougall Gardens. My grandfather, Charles James Cartwright (1882–1920)
travelled across the river from Bermondsey to the Isle of Dogs every day. He worked
as a welder at Samuel Hodge’s until his death in this accident alongside his brother,
who was also killed, and his father-in-law, my great-grandfather, Thomas Tilling, who
survived the explosion. The following account of the accident is taken from the report
written by G. Stevenson Taylor, Inspector of Factories [15].
The Warwick was a petroleum barge, designed to carry 42 000 gallons of petrol in
its tank (Fig. 1a). It had last been used for that purpose from 17th to 20th September
1920, before being sent for cleaning prior to work being carried out on it. On 22nd
September it was cleaned out by pumping out the remaining 19 gallons of petrol and
mopping up the remainder with cotton rags. Then on 23rd September it underwent
steam cleaning by putting a steam hose into the tank. On the morning of 24th Septem-
ber the barge was towed up the river from Purfleet where the cleaning had been carried
out to the Isle of Dogs. As it approached the wharf it could be seen from the barge
that a work party was ready to come aboard with acetylene torches; clearly they were
intending to get to work straight away, and this alarmed the lighterman (bargeman)
on board. My great-grandfather “Tilling heard Lazell, the lighterman, tell James [the
foreman] that, if they were going to use lights [i.e, flames] on the barge, he was off.”
The barge was moored at 11:45.
The idea was to remove the petrol tank from the barge to alter its bulkheads accord-
ing to the latest regulations. For this, the first job was to fit lifting lugs onto the tank,
which entailed removing rivets from the tank top with welding apparatus. As Taylor’s
report states
“Charles Cartwright (deceased) was using an oxy-acetylene burner, and
with this he was seen to burn the heads from a number of rivets along the
central joint in the tank top.”
4
Figure 1: Above: the design of the petroleum barge, Warwick, showing its petrol tank;
below: the remains of the Warwick after the explosion. Taken from the accident report
[15].
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At 11:55, the barge exploded (Fig. 1b); “all the witnesses describe the explosion as of
great violence.” One of these witnesses was Thomas Tilling, who “was on the wharf at
the time of the explosion and was blown against a wall and slightly injured.”
Let us continue with Taylor, who pieces together the facts of the matter in the best
detective tradition.
“The nature and extent of the damage to the tank and barge, as well as
the evidence of the witnesses, definitely indicate that a violent explosion
occurred within the tank itself and not in the surrounding spaces of the
barge. The fire, which lasted several minutes after the explosion, and the
blackening of parts of the interior of the tank by a slight sooty deposit, as
well as the general nature of the damage indicate that the explosion was
due to the ignition of some carbonaceous material (gas or vapour)”
wrote Taylor.
“The only hole which was burnt through the plate by the oxy-acetylene
burner was a small one, which was not finished at the time of the explo-
sion.” “Acetylene gas may ... be dismissed as a possible source of the
explosion”; “it must .. be concluded that the combustible matter in the
tank was present when the barge arrived at the wharf”
and
“the whole of the circumstances of the explosion are consistent with the
theory that it was caused by the ignition and subsequent explosion of a
mixture of petrol vapour and air in the tank.”
Taylor pointed out that “no test of the atmosphere of the tank for petrol was made
after the steaming”. He then performed the following calculation:
“The quantity of petrol required to render the atmosphere of the tank ex-
plosive can be readily ascertained. The tank has a capacity of 7,040 cubic
feet and the vapour of petrol of the quality carried in the tank is explosive
when mixed with air in proportions from 1 1/2 to 6 per cent., and about 3
per cent. of vapour or 210 cubic feet would produce a violently explosive
mixture in the tank. One cubic foot of petrol produces about 147 cubic
feet of vapour at normal temperature and pressure, so that 1 1/2 cubic feet
of petrol would produce over 210 cubic feet of vapour. The total area of
the interior surface of the tank and bulkheads is over 3,200 square feet,
so that an extremely thin film of petrol remaining on the whole interior
surface would produce explosive conditions when vapourised. Even a film
less than 1/450th of an inch in thickness on the bottom alone would be suf-
ficient to produce such conditions, whilst 1 1/2 cubic feet of liquid could
easily be disposed in and around the various angle and plate joints”.
Taylor’s findings were clear and unequivocal:
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“Having reached the conclusion that the tank contained a mixture of petrol
vapour and air on its arrival at Messrs. Hodge’s wharf, the source of the
ignition is not difficult to trace in the light of subsequent events. It is clear
from the evidence of several witnesses that an oxy-acetylene burner was
used to remove rivet heads on the outside of the tank, and that just when
the burner was being used to burn a hole in the plate of the tank top, the
explosion occurred. An examination of the damaged tank confirms this
evidence in every respect and shows that the explosion took place as soon
as the flame of the burner penetrated the plate.”
Taylor laid the responsibility with the barge owners:
“I consider that adequate precautions were not taken by the owners of the
barge to ensure that the tank was free from petrol vapour before handing
her over for repairs”.
It turned out, Taylor found, that other barges of the same type had previously been
taken to Hodge’s for the same modifications to be carried out, after the same cleaning
procedure, and had not exploded. The difference in those previous cases was that the
barges had lain a day at the wharf before being worked on. That must inadvertently
have saved the men who had worked on them, as the remaining liquid would have have
an extra day to evaporate, and the vapours would have had an extra day to disperse
before work began.
G. Stevenson Taylor was the first Senior Engineering Inspector in the newly formed
Engineering Branch of the inspectorate of factories for the Home Office. Taylor had
been appointed in April 1920 and the Warwick explosion was his first report in this
capacity [16]. Around this time there was a new drive for health and safety at work,
both in Britain and beyond, with the slogan “safety first”. In 1917 the Industrial “Safety
First” Committee was established in Britain, and in 1918 the British Industrial Safety
First Association was formed [17]. Harold Lloyd’s 1923 film “Safety Last!”, famous
for the image of Lloyd dangling from the hands of a clock high on a skyscraper, played
with the slogan. Ironically, Lloyd himself had lost a finger and thumb in an explosion:
a 1919 filming accident with a fake bomb that wasn’t.
3 Post 1920
Despite Safety First, despite the advance of both science and technology, an inflammable
vapour– or gas–air mixture plus a source of ignition continued to cause accidents. After
1920, such explosions have continued, even into recent decades. Just a few of these,
that illustrate the variety of detailed causes of such accidents, are the following. On
7th September 1951, a storage tank exploded at the Royal Edward Dock, Avonmouth,
Bristol, while being filled with gas oil, and killed two men [18]. The Apollo 13 mission
of April 1970, meant to be the third space mission to land on the moon, was aborted
half way to the moon, and its crew was narrowly saved after an explosion aboard the
spacecraft that occurred when stirring an oxygen tank for its fuel cells, which had been
incorrectly assembled leaving damaged electrical insulation on the wiring, which ig-
nited [19]. The Clarkston explosion of October 1971 killed 22 people at a shopping
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centre in Scotland when a gas leak ignited. The Flixborough disaster of 1974 was an
explosion at a chemical works that killed 28 people and “rattled the confidence of every
chemical engineer in the country” [20] when a pipe joint in a poorly modified cyclo-
hexane plant failed and the resulting gas cloud was ignited [21, 22, 23]. A fuel tanker
explosion of July 1978 in Los Alfaques, near Tarragona, Spain, killed 217 people when
a tanker lorry carrying propene leaked gas which exploded on encountering an ignition
source in a neighbouring seaside campsite. Piper Alpha was an oil rig in the North
Sea that exploded in July 1988 killing 167 people working on it when methane hy-
drate blocked a pump and another pump, partially dismantled for maintenance, leaked
inflammable gas when mistakenly switched on to take its place [24]. Flight TWA800
was a Boeing 747 aircraft that exploded in July 1996 minutes after taking off from
New York killing its 230 passengers and crew. Its loss was determined to be owing to
an explosion in its empty central fuel tank in which inflammable vapour was ignited by
a short circuit in the electrical connections [25]. The Buncefield accident of December
2005 at an oil storage facility in Hertfordshire killed no-one but caused an immense
explosion and fire when a petrol tank was overfilled and a cloud of vapour from it was
ignited [26]. The Deepwater Horizon was an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico that suffered
a blowout of inflammable gas that was ignited probably by coming into contact with
the diesel generators on board [27]; 11 people died in that April 2010 explosion, and it
produced a huge oil spill that caused environmental devastation in the Gulf of Mexico.
4 The theory of fluid mechanics of ignition, combus-
tion, and explosion
An explosion is a rapid increase in volume. Whether or not a chemical reaction in
a fluid leads to an explosion depends on the interaction between fluid mechanics and
chemical reaction. We may call these explosions thermo-kinetic because, as we shall
see, the explosion — i.e., fast reaction — can result from self-heating (thermal) or from
the chemical kinetics (chemical chain reaction) or from both factors.
Combustion science [28] is now a field with some beautiful and elegant theory
[29, 30], and experiments [31]. However, not everything is known. There are still areas
in which more knowledge of the processes taking place is needed [32], as we shall
discuss. It must also be noted that, as we have seen, the impact of thermal radiation
from these explosions is a major factor in terms of human health, and this aspect is also
the object of study [33, 34]. Combustion theory began to be developed in 1880s France
where Mallard and Le Chatelier worked on inflammability of gases; combustion and
its application to mine safety [35]. They developed a laminar flame speed theory for
the rate of expansion of the flame front in a combustion reaction [36, 37]. At almost
the same time, van’t Hoff worked on autoignition of gases and suggested a criterion for
when ignition would occur [38].
Semenov and his student Frank-Kamenetskii took up these ideas in 1930s Russia.
Semenov’s theory [39, 40] pertains to the case where convection is so vigorous that
the temperature in the vessel is uniform; Frank-Kamenetskii’s [41, 42] covers the other
limit where the transport of heat occurs by conduction only. For well-mixed systems,
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the reacting gas explodes when the Semenov number exceeds a critical value, when
ψ = k0c
n
0 qE/(χSvRT
2
0 )
is greater than 1/e. (Here k0 is the initial kinetic constant for first-order reaction A→
B, co is the initial concentration of species A, n is the order of the reaction, q is the
reaction exothermicity, E is the activation energy, χ is the heat transfer coefficient, Sv
is the surface area per unit volume, R is the universal gas constant, T0 is the constant
wall temperature.) When heat is transferred by thermal conduction alone, explosion
occurs when the Frank-Kamenetskii number is greater than a critical value, when
δ = l2k0c
n
0 qE/(κρ0CpRT
2
0 )
is greater than δc. (Here l is the reactor size, k0 is the initial kinetic constant for first-
order reaction A→B, c0 is the initial concentration of species A, n is the reaction order,
q is the reaction exothermicity, E is the activation energy, κ is the thermal diffusivity,
ρ0 is the initial density, Cp is the specific heat at constant pressure, R is the universal
gas constant, T0 is the constant wall temperature. The critical value depends on the
geometry of the system; it is 3.32 for a sphere, 2.00 for a cylinder and 0.88 for parallel
plates [42].) But in most reacting systems heat loss occurs due to the combined effects
of natural convection and heat conduction.
In parallel to these works, fluid mechanics was developing. The equations for the
movement of a fluid were written down in the early 19th century by Navier, Cauchy,
Poisson, Saint Venant, and Stokes [43]. In the second half of the 20th century, with
the advent of the electronic computer it became possible to solve the Navier–Stokes
equations numerically. Computational fluid dynamics, CFD, methods are now ubiq-
uitous. One can couple these computational methods with the equations of chemical
kinetics to solve numerically how a reaction behaves in a fluid medium. Three physical
processes combine in a reacting flow: fluid dynamics, thermodynamics, and chemical
reaction. Each process has its own space- and timescales, which may be very different
from those of the other processes. Such differences of scales, on one hand, can allow
simplification of a theoretical model (but on the other hand, they can also be a source
of numerical difficulties). The fluid dynamics is a balance between the temporal evo-
lution and the spatial convection of the flow properties governed by the conservation
of mass, momentum and energy. Reactive fluid thermodynamics includes microscopic
heat transfer between gas molecules, work performed with pressure and associated
volume change. And chemical reactions determine the generation and destruction of
chemical species while observing mass conservation.
One application of the theory of chemically reactive flows is to mining, as its pio-
neers had studied. We may note that both original types of miners’ safety lamps work
because the mesh or tubes function as a flame arrestor. The metal absorbs heat from a
flame front, so that the front decays and the flame dies. This mechanism depends criti-
cally on the size of the tubes or the mesh. As well as mining, a further application, this
time one where explosions are wanted, but need to be controlled, is the internal com-
bustion engine. An amount of work has been carried out under the heading of knock,
or preignition, in the internal combustion engine [44, 28]. (It should be noted that this
is generally a two phase system, as droplets of fuel, not vapour are the reactant. It has
9
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Figure 2: The regime diagram summarizing simulations without consumption of re-
actant, with closed circles representing no explosion and open circles, explosion. τH
is the timescale for heating by reaction; τC is the timescale for convection, τD is the
timescale for diffusion. The ho izontal axis then denotes the well-mixed l mit; the ver-
tical axis represents the purely conductive limit. The relative importance of thermal
conduction and natural convection in the system is shown by the Rayleigh number Ra;
when Ra < 500, heat transfer is controlled by conduction; laminar convection dom-
inates heat transfer for 500 < Ra < 106; for Ra > 106, the flow is turbulent. The
other solid and dotted lines, respectively, represent the explosion limit in the laminar
and turbulent regimes. From [47].
been argued that fuel involved in the Buncefield explosion, described above, may have
been in the form of such a mist of droplets [45].) Knock in internal combustion engines
has been associated with cool flame formation, and cool flames resulting from complex
thermo-kinetic interactions [46] in turn have been implicated in the TWA800 explosion
mentioned above.
Recent theoretical work in the last two decades, which takes the Semenov and
Frank-Kamenetskii approaches and moves them forward, is by the group of Cardoso in
Cambridge. Following an approach first put forward by Cardoso et al. [49, 50], Liu et
al. [47] proposed that in these systems the occurrence or not of an explosion depends
on the relative magnitudes of three timescales: that for chemical reaction to heat up
the fluid to ignition, the timescale for thermal conduction and that for natural convec-
tion. They summarized their results in a two-dimensional regime diagram, Fig. 2, in
which Frank-Kamenetskii’s purely conductive system and Semenov’s well-mixed sys-
tem appear as two limiting cases, represented by the two axes. The plane in between
the two axes contains all the systems with different relative magnitudes of heat loss by
conduction and by natural convection. This approach has the advantage of quantifying
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Fig. 1.  Schematic regime diagram with the three axes,  CH WW / ,  DH WW /  and  RH WW / , for an exothermic 
reaction occurring inside a closed spherical vessel. The grey surface separates the inner region, where 
explosions occur, from the outer one, where they do not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Schematic regime diagram with the three axes, τH/τC , τH/τD and τH/τR,
for an exothermic reaction occurring inside a closed spherical vessel. τH is the
timescale for heating by reaction; τC is the timescale for convection, τD is the timescale
for diffusion and τR is the timescale for reaction. The grey surface separates the inner
region, where explosions occur, from the outer one, where they do not. From [48].
separately the stabilizing effects of conduction and natural convection on an explosion.
In a subsequent paper, they then extended the these ideas to explore how the con-
sumption of reactant alters the onset of a thermal explosion [48]. They showed that
whether or not a chemical reaction in a fluid leads to an explosion is shown to depend
on four timescales: (1) that for the chemical reaction to heat up the fluid containing the
reactants and products,
τH =
ρ0Cp∆Ts
k0cn0 q
,
ρ0 being the initial density, Cp the specific heat at constant pressure, k0 is the initial
kinetic constant for first-order reaction A→ B, co is the initial concentration of species
A, n is the order of the reaction, q is the reaction exothermicity, and ∆Ts = RT 20 /E
(E being an activation energy) is a temperature increase scale; (2) for cooling by heat
conduction or diffusion out of the system,
τD =
l2
κ
,
l being the reactor size and κ the thermal diffusivity; (3) for natural convection in the
fluid,
τC =
l
U
,
U being a characteristic velocity; and finally (4) for chemical reaction that uses up the
reactant.
τR = 1/k0,
11
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the temperature starts rising at the bottom of the vessel,
accompanied by reactant depletion, and buoyancy is triggered
within the fluid. However, since the natural convection inten-
sity is weaker (lower tH/tNC), it takes longer for the hot region
to shift upwards than any of the cases examined so far. The
inversion of the flow at the centre occurs only at t = 4.93 s, also
later than in cases I and II. Owing to the interaction between
buoyancy and forced convection the hot region expands further
to both sides of the reactor where the cooling by diffusion of
colder species from the inlet stream is not so efficient. This
allows the fluid to heat up by reaction quite rapidly, leading to
explosion at t = 11.5 s.
The behaviour of case V is shown in Fig. 8. In this case, since
convection is stronger than in previous cases, the hot region
travels swiftly to the centre of the vessel and starts spreading
away from the vertical axis. As heat is readily lost through the
walls, the temperature does not rise as high as for cases with
weaker natural convection and, for the same reason, the reactant
does not deplete as extensively as in cases II or IV. Thus, forced
convection counterbalances the upward buoyant flow and reverses
the flow at the centre once again, at t = 5.90 s. The hot region is
pushed downwards and closer to the walls, enhancing heat loss,
and the temperature drops to a minimum at t = 10.0 s. Heating by
reaction continues to occur at the bottom of the vessel, with the
feed of pure species A from the injected stream, and reheats the
system (t = 17.5 s). However, owing to strong buoyancy present in
the system, the heat is quickly lost to the surroundings and the
fuel is replenished, completing the second oscillation of tempera-
ture, concentration and flow at t = 23.5 s. The temperature and
concentration in the vessel continue to oscillate after this
moment, with decreasing amplitude, to become almost uni-
dentifiable (Fig. 8). Yet, if one observes time points t = 23.5 s
and t = 30.0 s, the difference in the size of the hot region is
indeed recognisable, being slightly larger in the latter.
The evolution of temperature, concentration of A and flow fields
for case VI, with tH/tNC = 13.0, is shown in Fig. 9. This case shows
an extremely quick development of buoyant flow, deforming the
hot region into the v-shape in less than 5 seconds, and promoting
immediate heat loss through the walls. In fact, the reaction is so
fast that a steady state is attained before t = 10.0 s.
Fig. 10 compares the temporal evolution of the heat flow
through the walls for cases II and IV to VI. This figure clearly
Fig. 7 Evolution of the fields of (a) temperature, (b) reactant concentration
and (c) streamlines for case IV, with tD/tFC = 5.0, tH/tR = 0.05, tH/tD = 0.16
and tH/tNC = 7.0.
Fig. 8 Evolution of the fields of (a) temperature, (b) reactant concentration
and (c) streamlines for case V, with tD/tFC = 5.0, tH/tR = 0.05, tH/tD = 0.16
and tH/tNC = 11.0.
Fig. 9 Evolution of the fields of (a) temperature, (b) reactant concentration
and (c) streamlines for case VI, with tD/tFC = 5.0, tH/tR = 0.05, tH/tD = 0.16
and tH/tNC = 13.0.
Fig. 10 Evolution of heat fluxes through the wall of the vessel for case IV
(dotted line), case II (solid line), case V (densely dashed line) and case VI
(loosely dashed line). All cases are for reactions with tD/tFC = 5.0, tH/tR = 0.05
and tH/tD = 0.16.
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Figure 4: Numerical simulations with computational fluid dynamics of explosion in a
spherical reactor with mixed convection; evolution of the fields of (a) temperature, (b)
reactant concentration and (c) streamlines. The temperature starts rising at the bottom
of the vessel, accompanied by reactant depletion, and buoyancy is triggered within the
fluid. Owing to the interaction between buoyancy and forced convection the hot region
expands further to both sides of the reactor where the cooling by diffusion of colder
species from the inlet stream is not so efficient. This allows the fluid to heat up by
reaction, leading to explosion at t = 11.5 s. From [51].
k0 being the initial kinetic constant for first-order reaction A→ B.
The behaviour of the system can be depicted on a three-dimensional regime dia-
gram, as shown in Fig. 3, where the three ratios of the four timescales are the coordi-
nates. There is a surface separating the region near the origin where explosions occur
from the region further from the origin where the stabilizing effects of heat conduction,
natural convection and consumption of reactant prevent explosions. The vertical axis
τH/τD represents the purely conductive limit ignoring depletion of reactant, i.e., the
systems considered by Frank-Kamenetskii. The right-hand axis, τH/τC gives the well-
mixed limit of Semenov with no co sumption of reactant. And the third, l ft-hand axis
τH/τR measures the effect of the disappearance of reactant on the heating up of the
fluid; for example, if the chemical reaction in effect depletes the reactant much faster
than fluid is heating up (e.g., because the heat of reaction is very small), then τH  τR
and we xp ct the temperature rise in the fluid to be small and explosion not to oc ur.
The synthesis of these two limits into one — thermal and kinetic effects into a thermo-
kinetic theory — is a beautiful piece of theory, bridging and bringing together points
often seen as separate, but which really are not separate at all, as the figures show.
The Cardoso group also performed numerical CFD simulations of the effects of
combined natural and forced convection on thermal explosion in a spherical reactor
with upward natural convection from internal heating caused by a chemical reaction to
hich they dded downward forced convection driven by inj cting fluid at the top and
removing it at the bottom of the reactor [52, 51]. They found oscillatory behaviour for
moderate forced convection. They also found that that explosive behaviour is favoured
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by a balance between the natural and forced flows, owing to a nearly stagnant zone
close to the centre of the reactor that quickly heats up to explosion; Fig. 4. It is counter-
intuitive that explosion may occur in an otherwise stable reactor by injecting cold fluid
or enhancing natural convection.
The foregoing theory is for a homogeneous mixture of reactants in a vessel with its
walls at constant temperature. One important aspect where theory has been inadequate
and computational fluid dynamics needed is the deflagration to detonation transition
[54]. In deflagration there is a subsonic flame propagation velocity and in the reaction
zone, chemical combustion progresses through the medium by the diffusion of heat
and mass. In contrast, in a detonation there is a supersonic flame propagation velocity,
and the reaction zone is a shock wave where the reaction is initiated by compressive
heating caused by the shock wave. This regime has generally needed numerical simu-
lations of computational fluid dynamics for its understanding. A general theory of the
deflagration-to-detonation transition (Fig. 5) has recently been presented together with
an interesting astrophysical application to the explosion of stars. Poludnenko et al show
that thermonuclear combustion waves in type Ia supernovae are qualitatively similar to
chemical combustion waves on Earth because they are controlled by the same physical
mechanisms and are not sensitive to the details of the equation-of-state, microphysi-
cal transport, or reaction kinetics [53]. They discuss how a deflagration-to-detonation
transition may have been involved in some industrial accidents, such as at Buncefield.
At the same time, the astrophysical application demonstrates how interdisciplinary this
field at the interface between fluid mechanics and chemistry is, and how far from ter-
restrial concerns it can get.
5 Safety first?
During the past century, combustion theory has grown from its incipient state to fully
fledged. The understanding of chemical reaction kinetics has evolved immensely. Fluid
mechanics has developed both theory and also numerical solutions with CFD methods
as computers first appeared and subsequently have doubled in speed every eighteen
months or so. Engineering — chemical, but also mechanical, civil, and other branches
— has likewise advanced at an ever increasing pace. And health and safety planning
has progressed enormously in foreseeing and eliminating risks since the early days
of factory and engineering inspectors and safety first. Nonetheless, gas and vapour
explosions have killed many people, and in many of these cases a container or tank
was involved, as in the accident of my grandfather.
In the last 100 years, there have been developed and implemented systems for mak-
ing safer such (especially) fuel tanks with a nitrogen or similar inert atmosphere, or a
non-combustible atmosphere such as carbon dioxide. Some second world war aircraft
used inerting systems, and tanker ships trialled them in the 1920s. On-board inert
gas generation systems have been developed for aircraft [55]. Tanker ships use ei-
ther gases produced in combustion by the ship engines, or they generate inert gases
[56]. Likewise, so-called hypoxic or oxygen-reduced air systems with low-oxygen-
concentration air have been developed for buildings: for archives, warehouses, electri-
cal substations and other buildings where reducing is preferred to eliminating oxygen
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Figure 4: Simulated (A-E) and experimental (F-J) schlieren images of the turbulent flame
during the pressure runaway and subsequent detonation formation. Experiment in panels
F-H was carried out at   = 0.888 (cf. Fig. 2B), experiment in panels I and J was carried out at
  = 0.905. Simulated schlieren images shown in panels A-E are from the same simulation as
Fig. 1.
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Figure 5: Simulated (A–E) and experimental (F–J) schlieren images of turbulent flame
evolution. Once the flame front has developed, it begins to propagate toward the open
end of the channel (A and F). Pressure waves generated within the turbulent flame
propagate into the unburned material and form a compressed region ahead of the flame
(B and G). As the runaway process develops, multiple pressure waves coalesce into a
flame-generated shock, the strength of which grows with time (C and H). Eventually,
the shock triggers a deflagration-to-detonation transition, DDT (D and I) and gives rise
to detonation (E and J). From [53].
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[57]. And racing-car fuel tank or fuel cell technology involves filling the tank with an
open-cell foam, again to reduce the explosion risk. We can see all these safety systems
as playing with the parameters of the theory that we have described above, to move
from an explosive to a non-explosive part of the parameter space. So why have such
safety systems not, like miners’ safety lamps, become the norm? It is arguable that
in some instances, that of cars, for instance, car fuel tank explosions are (despite the
mythopoeia of Hollywood) rather rare. This does not appear to be the case, however,
for tanker ships. Devanney [58] compiled a long list of tanker ship accidents caused by
explosions in fuel tanks. He asks regarding inerting,
“why was the industry so slow to adopt such an obvious, effective, safety
measure which probably pays for itself in reduction of tank corrosion?”
and answers his own question
“the cost[s] of implementing inerting to these ships were more than the
dollar benefits of the lives and ships saved”,
because
“a tanker owner rarely suffers any loss when one of his ships blows up. His
P&I [Protection and Indemnity] insurance pays off the dead crew’s family,
in most past cases a few thousand dollars per head. His hull insurance
covers the loss of the ship. In many cases, the insured value is more than
the market value and the owner comes out ahead.”
This review has demonstrated how, from the very beginning, the science of explo-
sions has been inextricably intertwined with its societal implications. As I write, with
the centenary of my grandfather’s death approaching, I do wonder whether more could
not be done, with more innovative solutions from scientific and technological ideas, to
reduce further the risk of explosion, in the same way that miners’ safety lamps were
developed and used. Despite great advances in both science and engineering, gas and
vapour explosions continue. I began this review with sewer explosions of two millennia
ago; these still occur on occasion. A fuel tanker blew up a century ago owing to incor-
rect working methods with fuel vapour. That was then, but how can it be that a century
on fuel tankers are still blowing up for the same reason? Has it really been safety first,
or safety last? Whether or not further regulatory action is needed is a question that
scientists involved with the societal responsibilities of science should consider. From
the point of view of the science itself, in this field, science has always engaged with
the practical questions arising from explosions, from the Felling pit explosion of 1812
leading to the miners’ safety lamp, to the Deepwater Horizon explosion of 2010 and
the resulting oil spill in the waters below the rig that has led to a great quantity of re-
search into the dynamics of two-phase plumes [59], and from the Buncefield explosion
of 2005 to the latest results on supernovae explosions [53], I am sure that new scientific
advances will continue to emerge from the fluid mechanics of explosion.
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